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Case No. 20100831
INTHE

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/ Appellee,
vs.
STEPHEN BRADLEY ADAMSON,
Defendant/Appellant.

Brief of Appellee
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The State appeals from an order of dismissal following the suppression of
evidence. This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 77-18a-l(3)(b)
(West Supp. 2006) and Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(e) (West 2009).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
Was the officer's investigation of Defendant following a traffic stop within
the proper scope of the stop or otherwise supported by a reasonable, articulable
suspicion of further illegality?
Standard of Review. A trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion to
suppress is a mixed question of law and fact. The court's underlying factual
findings are reviewed for clear error. State v. Krukowski, 2004 UT 94, f 11,100

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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P.3d 1222. The court's legal conclusions are reviewed non-deferentially for
correctness, including its application of the legal standard to the facts. State v.
Brake, 2004 UT 95, «|[ 11,103 P.3d 699.
Presewation. The issue on appeal was preserved by the State in its memorandum and arguments opposing Defendant's motion to suppress, see R.89-92,
R.140:ll-13, and in its motion to reconsider, R.89-92. The district court ruled on
these motions in two memorandum decisions, see R.77-85,100-01, and in a final
order which included findings of fact and conclusions of law, see R.103-09.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
The following provisions are reproduced in Addendum A: U.S. Const.
amend. IV; Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-518.2 (West Supp. 2008); Utah Code Ann. §
41-6a-530 (West Supp. 2007); Utah Code Ann. § 53-3-220 (West Supp. 2008).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged with (1) driving under the influence of alcohol, a
third degree felony; (2) violating a "no alcohol" driver's license restriction, a
class B misdemeanor; (3) tampering with an ignition interlock system, a class B
misdemeanor; (4) failure to signal, a class C misdemeanor; and (5) failure to
illuminate the rear registration plate, a class C misdemeanor. R.l-3. After a

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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preliminary hearing, Defendant was bound over to district court to stand trial
on all counts. R.27-28.
Following bindover, Defendant moved to suppress the evidence, arguing
that the officer's administration of field sobriety tests exceeded the permissible
scope of the traffic stop. R.34-42. After an evidentiary hearing and oral
argument, R.43,76, the district court granted Defendant's motion in a
memorandum decision. R.77-86. The State moved to reconsider, but the court
denied the motion. R.89-93,100-02. The district court then entered Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law, Order of Suppression, Order Denying Motion to
Reconsider, and Final Order. R.103-10,123. The case was thereafter dismissed
on the ground that suppression of the evidence substantially impaired the
prosecution's case. R.132-33. The State timely appealed. R.134-35.
STATEMENT OF FACTS1
On the night of December 19, 2008, Trooper Cody McCoy and his DUI
field training officer, Brian Spillman ("FTO Spillman"), were parked in their
patrol car near the Duces Wild bar in the hope of making a DUI stop for training
purposes. R.139:25,27,31 (R.104:^l,3). At approximately 10:30 p.m., the
1

The facts are taken primarily from testimony elicited at the suppression
hearing on February 22, 2010. See R.139. Citations in parentheses refer to the
district court's corresponding findings of fact or conclusions of law.
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officers saw Defendant drive out of the bar's parking lot in a car without a
working rear license plate light R.139: 8 (R.104:fl). The officers followed
Defendant and saw him move "in the left-hand turning lane like [he] was going
to turn onto the freeway without using a signal" and "[t]hen turn[ ] back into
traffic without using a signal." R.139: 8-9,1445,26 (R.104:t2). The troopers
activated their overhead lights and made a traffic stop. R.139: 9 (R.104:^[4).
Trooper McCoy approached the stopped car to make contact with
Defendant; FTO Spillman remained in the patrol car. R.139:9,27 (R.104:Tf5).
Trooper McCoy asked Defendant if he had his driver's license. R.139:10.
Defendant responded in the affirmative and produced a card, which Trooper
McCoy assumed was a driver's license. R.139:10 (R.104:^|7). Trooper McCoy
also requested Defendant's registration and insurance information, which
Defendant produced. R.139:10 (R.1Q4:H5-7).2 Trooper McCoy had a difficult
time understanding Defendant during their exchange because each time
Defendant answered a question, "he'd look away" and speak "very quiet[ly]."
R.139:10 (R.104:f 8).

2

The trial court also found that Trooper McCoy asked Defendant if he
had been drinking, which Defendant denied. See R.104:^5,9. However, no
testimony was elicited to that effect, at either the preliminary hearing, R.138, or
the suppression hearing, R.139.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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After collecting Defendant's documents, Trooper McCoy returned to the
patrol car and informed FTO Spillman that he did not detect a distinctive odor
of alcohol, R139:10,17,29 (R.104:! 110-11), "just a minty smell," R.139:17,29. He
also explained, however, that Defendant "was really quiet." R.139:29. When
examining Defendant's documents, the two officers discovered that Defendant
had provided an identification card, not a driver's license. R.139:10-ll,27
(R.105:f 12). The officers were nevertheless able to run a license check, which
revealed that Defendant had a valid license, but was an "alcohol restricted
driver."

R.139:10-ll,27-28,32 (R.105:^13-14).

As such, Defendant was

(1) required to maintain an ignition interlock device in his vehicle, and (2) prohibited from driving with a measurable or detectable amount of alcohol in his
body. R.139:ll-12,28 (R.105:1J14); accord Utah Code Ann. § 53-3-220 (West Supp.
2008). The computer check also revealed that Defendant had two prior DUI
convictions, but no outstanding warrants. R.139:28 (R.105:^[13).
Given Defendant's prior DUI history, the fact that Defendant was "really
quiet," and the possibility that the inexperienced trooper "might not have
caught onto" the possibility Defendant had consumed alcohol, FTO Spillman
told Trooper McCoy to have Defendant exit his car so that he could better assess
whether Defendant had consumed alcohol. R.139:18,28-29. FTO Spillman also
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asked Trooper McCoy to verify that the ignition interlock device was installed in
Defendant's car. R.139:29 (R.105:^[17).
After discussing the case with FTO Spillman, Trooper McCoy returned to
Defendant's car and asked Defendant whether he had an ignition interlock
device installed. R.139:12 (R.105:^[16). Defendant grabbed the device, turned to
the trooper, and said, "Oh yeah, it's hanging right here." R.139:12 (R.105:fl7).
When he did so, Trooper McCoy noticed for the first time the odor of alcohol
coming from Defendant. R.139:12 (R.105:f 18). At that point, Trooper McCoy
directed Defendant to step out of the car and again asked if he had his driver's
license. R.139:13 (R.105:^15,18). Defendant said, "Oh, yeah," and gave the
trooper his license. R.139:13.
Trooper McCoy administered field sobriety tests, R.139:13 (R.104:^fl8),
which Defendant failed, R.138:5~9,17-24. Following the field sobriety tests,
Trooper McCoy arrested Defendant for DUI and several other offenses.
(R.105:^[19). Defendant was thereafter transported to the police station and
asked to submit to an Intoxilyzer test. R.138:9. When Defendant refused the
test, the troopers secured a warrant to draw a blood sample. R.138:9. A blood
sample was drawn and tested, revealing a blood alcohol level of .26. R.138:10.
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The district court concluded that Trooper McCoy exceeded the lawful
scope of the traffic stop when he asked Defendant whether his vehicle was
equipped with an ignition interlock device. This Court should reverse.
The law is well settled that during a routine traffic stop, an officer may
request the driver's license and conduct a computer check on that license. The
purpose of such a license check is to confirm that the driver is legally authorized
to operate the vehicle on the highways of the State. The United States Supreme
Court has recognized that officers may verify compliance with licensing
requirements, so long as the initial stop is lawful. Accordingly, where a
computer check reveals that a driver's license to drive is subject to an ignition
interlock system restriction, the officer may verify compliance with that
restriction. The stop in this case was justified at its inception. Accordingly,
when Trooper McCoy discovered that Defendant was an alcohol restricted
driver, he properly verified that Defendant was in compliance with that
licensing requirement.
Even assuming, arguendo, that verification of Defendant's license
restriction was beyond the proper scope of the stop, it was justified because
Trooper McCoy had a reasonable, articulable suspicion that Defendant was in

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
-7-may contain errors.
Machine-generated OCR,

violation of the law prohibiting alcohol restricted drivers from operating motor
vehicles not equipped with the required ignition interlock system. Trooper
McCoy did not observe the ignition interlock device during his initial exchange
with Defendant. Accordingly, when he discovered that Defendant was an
alcohol restricted driver, he had a reasonable suspicion that Defendant was in
violation of the law, justifying further inquiry.
Trooper McCoy's ensuing investigation was supported by reasonable
suspicion of further illegality. After smelling alcohol from Defendant during
their second exchange, Trooper McCoy had reasonable suspicion that Defendant
had a measurable or detectable amount of alcohol in his body. The facts
supporting a reasonable suspicion determination included: (1) Defendant drove
out of a bar parking lot alone, (2) Defendant's driving was somewhat erratic,
(3) Defendant was evasive when he initially spoke with Defendant, turning
away from the trooper and speaking quietly when he answered questions,
(4) Defendant had two prior DUI convictions and was currently an alcohol
restricted driver, and (5) once Defendant faced Trooper McCoy to answer a
question, the trooper smelled the odor of alcohol coming from Defendant.
These facts, when considered together, support a finding of reasonable
suspicion and outweigh any facts that would suggest otherwise.
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ARGUMENT
THE TROOPERS' DETENTION OF DEFENDANT WAS
REASONABLE
A traffic stop must meet two basic requirements to satisfy the Fourth
Amendment. First, the stop must be "lawful at its inception," and second, the
stop must be "executed in a reasonable manner." Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405,
408 (2005). "If, during the scope of a traffic stop, the officer forms new
reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity, the officer may also
expediently investigate his new suspicion." State v. Baker, 2010 UT18, ^f 13,229
P.3d 650. Otherwise, "the officer must allow the seized person to depart." Id.
The stop at issue here satisfied both requirements.
A. The traffic stop was justified at its inception.
A traffic stop is justified at its inception if the officer has "probable cause
or reasonable articulable suspicion of [a] traffic violation or other criminal
activity." Baker, 2010 UT 18, <([ 16. In this case, Trooper McCoy observed that
Defendant's "license plate light wasn't working," R.139:8 (R.104:|l),.a violation
of the Utah Traffic Code. See Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-1604(2)(c) (West Supp.
2005) (requiring the illumination of the rear registration plate). He also saw
Defendant move into "the left turning l a n e . . . without using a signal" and then
"turn[ ] back into traffic without using a signal," R.139:8-9,14-15,26 (R.104:Tf2),
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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also a violation of the Traffic Code. See Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-804(l)(a) (West
Supp. 2007) (requiring an appropriate signal when changing lanes). Such
"observed traffic violation[s]" gave Trooper McCoy "'at the least, probable
cause to believe [Defendant] had committed a traffic offense/ " State v. Lopez,
873 P.2d 1127,1132 (Utah 1994) (quoting State v. Smith, 781 P.2d 879, 882 n.2
(Utah App. 1989)).
Indeed, in seeking suppression of the evidence below, Defendant "d[id]
not argue that the stop itself was unlawful." R.79; see R.31-42,70-75. The district
court also agreed that Troopers McCoy and Spillman "were justified in stopping
the defendant for the improper lane change and burned out light." R.79.
Accordingly, whether the stop was justified at its inception is not an issue on
appeal.
B.

The stop was executed in a reasonable manner.
A traffic stop, justified at its inception, must also be "executed in a

reasonable manner." Caballes, 543 U.S. at 408. To comply with this requirement,
the ensuing detention must be "'reasonably related in scope to the
circumstances which justified the interference in the first place/ " Id. at 419
(quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968)). The detaining officer must also
"'diligently pursue[ ] a means of investigation'" that is likely to satisfy the
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purpose of the stop in an expeditious manner. State v. Worwood, 2007 UT 47, f
28,164 P.3d 397 (quoting United States v. Slmrpe, 470 U.S. 675,686 (1985)); accord
Baker, 2010 UT 18, f 17. Typically, "the officer must allow the seized person to
depart once the purpose of the [traffic] stop has concluded." Baker, 2010 UT 18,
f 13. However, if "reasonable suspicion of a further illegality" arises during the
lawful course of a stop, it may be appropriately extended to investigate that
illegality. State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125, f 31, 63 P.3d 650; accord Baker, 2010 UT
18, If 13.
ic *

*

The district court ruled that Trooper McCoy "impermissibly extended the
scope of the detention beyond its original intent/7 to wit, " issuing citations for
the minor traffic infractions." R.108:^[^f 12,17. The court concluded that under
"[t]he totality of evidence that was available to Trooper McCoy/' he "did not
have a reasonable, articulable suspicion of alcohol use to justify expanding the
scope" of the stop. R.107:^9,13. This Court should reverse. Each of the
trooper's actions was either "'reasonably related in scope to the circumstances
which justified the interference in the first place/ " Caballes, 543 U.S. at 419
(quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 20), or was supported by "reasonable suspicion of a
further illegality," Hansen, 2002 UT 125, f 31.
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1. Trooper McCoy's request for Defendant's driver's license and
registration and his corresponding computer checks were
reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified
the stop in the first place.
After stopping Defendant, Trooper McCoy requested his driver's license
and registration.

R.139:10 (R.104:^[5). Although Defendant produced an

identification card rather than a driver's license, the troopers were nevertheless
able to run a computer check on the status of Defendant's driver's license.
R.139:10-ll,27-28 (R.105:^12-13). That check revealed Defendant was an
"alcohol restricted driver," meaning that his license to drive was restricted to
vehicles equipped with an ignition interlock system.

R.139:10-ll,27-28,32

(R.l05:t1jl3-14); accord Utah Code Ann. § 53-3-220 (West Supp. 2008).
In moving to suppress the evidence, Defendant did not challenge Trooper
McCoy's request for his driver's license and registration, or the computer check
on the status of his driver's license. See R.31-42,70-75. Nor did the district court
find any police misconduct in those actions. See R.77-86,103-10. For good
reason—the law is well established that" 'an officer conducting a routine traffic
stop may request a driver's license and vehicle registration, [and] conduct a
computer check'" to verify that information. Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1132 (quoting
State v. Robinson, 797 P.2d 431,435 (Utah App. 1990)).
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2. Trooper McCoy's inquiry as to whether Defendant's vehicle
was equipped with an ignition interlock system was also
reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified
the stop in the first place.
After running the computer checks and discussing the stop with FTO
Spillman, Trooper McCoy walked back to the stopped car and asked Defendant
whether he had the required ignition interlock system installed in his car. R.139:
12,18,28-29 (R.105:fT[16-17). In response, Defendant grabbed the device/turned
to the trooper, and said, "Oh yeah, it's hanging right here."

R.139:12

(R.105:fl6). When he did so, Trooper McCoy smelled the odor of alcohol
coming from Defendant R139:12 (R.105:^|18).
The district court ruled that Trooper McCoy's "subsequent questioning
about the ignition interlock device was [not] an acceptable extension of the
detention/' absent "a new reasonable, articulable suspicion that [Defendant] had
been drinking and driving." R.81. The court then concluded that Trooper
McCoy "did not have a reasonable, articulable suspicion of alcohol use" and
thus "impermissibly extended the scope of the detention beyond its original
intent" R.84 (R.107:^9-12). This Court should reverse. Verifying that a
lawfully stopped driver is legally authorized to operate a vehicle on the
highways of the State is reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that
justified the stop in the first place.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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As noted above, the law is settled that during the course of an ordinary
traffic stop, an officer "'may request a driver's license and .. .conduct a
computer check" on that license. Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1132 (Robinson, 797 P.2d at
435). In State v. Chism, this Court reaffirmed that a driver lawfully stopped
"must . . . produce his driver license and submit to confirmation of his or Iter
driving privileges:' 2005 UT App 41, \ 15,107 P.3d 706 (emphasis added). In
other words, the purpose in requesting a driver's license and conducting a
corresponding computer check is to confirm that the driver is legally authorized
to operate the vehicle.

If the computer check reveals that the operator's

privilege to drive is subject to certain conditions, it is only reasonable (and
logical) that the officer may also verify that the driver has satisfied those
conditions. Like a computer check, such confirmation imposes "no additional
intrusion on the driver." Id.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has likewise recognized that during a
routine traffic stop, an officer may properly investigate the authority of the
driver to operate the vehicle. That court held that "[djuring a traffic stop for [a
moving violation], a police officer is permitted to ask such questions, examine
such documentation, and run such computer verifications as necessary to
determine that the driver has a valid license and is entitled to operate tlte vehicle.
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United States v. Wood, 106 F.3d 942,945 (10th Or. 1997) (emphasis added). The
court also held that "[t]he officer may detain the driver and his vehicle as long
as reasonably necessary to make these determinations and to issue a citation or
warning." Id. Thus, as in Chism, the Tenth Circuit has recognized that an officer
may take those steps reasonably necessary to confirm the subject's driving
privileges. These holdings are consistent with Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648
(1979).
In Prouse, the United States Supreme Court recognized that the "the States
have a vital interest in ensuring that only those qualified to do so are permitted
to operate motor vehicles, that these vehicles are fit for safe operation, and lience
that licensing, registration, and vehicle inspection requirements are observed!' Id. at
658 (emphasis added). The Court held that although police cannot conduct
random checks to assure compliance, they may "check [a] driver's license" to
drive "in those situations in which there is at least articulable and reasonable
suspicion that a motorist is unlicensed or that an automobile is not registered, or
tliat eitlter tlie vehicle or an occupant is otlierwise subject to seizure for violation oflaw."
Id. at 663 (emphasis added). Accordingly, so long as a vehicle is lawfully
stopped, the police officer may verify "that licensing .. .requirements are
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observed." Id. at 658. And of course, it follows that if a license to drive is subject
to restrictions, the officer may verify that those restrictions are satisfied.
In sum, and contrary to the district court's ruling, further reasonable
suspicion was not required for Trooper McCoy to confirm that Defendant
satisfied his license restriction. Because the traffic stop was justified at its
inception,

he

was justified

in confirming

that

Defendant's

"licen-

sing. .. requirements [were] observed." Id. at 658. This Court should thus
reverse the ruling below.3
3. Trooper McCoy's inquiry regarding the ignition interlock
system was also supported by reasonable suspicion.
Even assuming, arguendo, that Trooper McCoy's inquiry regarding the
ignition interlock device required reasonable suspicion of further illegality, he
had it. The law provides that "[a]n alcohol restricted driver that operates or is in
actual physical control of a vehicle in this state without an ignition interlock
system is guilty of a class B misdemeanor." Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-518.2(3)
(West Supp. 2008). As found by the district court, Trooper McCoy did not see
3

In addition to verifying Defendant's registration and license status,
Trooper McCoy ran a background check and learned that although Defendant
had "no outstanding warrants, . . . he did have two prior DUI convictions."
R.105:^[13. The law is settled that such checks are likewise within the proper
scope of a traffic stop. See State v. Markland, 2005 UT 26, Tf 29, 112 P.3d 507
(holding an officer may conduct "a warrants check... so long as the check does
not unreasonably extend the time of detention").
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an ignition interlock device during his first interaction with Defendant.
R.105:f 17. Accordingly, upon learning that Defendant was an alcohol restricted
driver required to have an ignition interlock system in his car, Trooper McCoy
had a reasonable, articulable suspicion that Defendant was in violation of the
license restriction. Cf. State v. Naisbitt, 827 P.2d 969, 971 (Utah App. 1992)
(holding an officer's "inability to determine whether [a] vehicle [is] properly
licensed justifie[s] [a traffic] stop").
The district court suggested that Trooper McCoy also needed "reasonable,
articulable suspicion of alcohol use to justify expanding the scope" to an inquiry
regarding the ignition interlock device. R.84. However, alcohol use is not an
element of the offense of driving without an ignition interlock system. See Utah
Code Ann. § 41-6a-518.2(3). The court's ruling is incorrect and should be
reversed.
4. Trooper McCoy's ensuing investigation was supported by
reasonable suspicion that Defendant was driving with a
measurable or detectable amount of alcohol in his body.
After detecting the odor of alcohol from Defendant, Trooper McCoy asked
him to exit the vehicle and then administered field sobriety tests. See R.139:13
(R.105:^fl8). Trooper McCoy was justified in administering those tests because
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by that point, he had a reasonable, articulable suspicion that Defendant had
consumed alcohol in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-530 (West Supp. 2007).
Section 41-6a-530 provides that "[a]n alcohol restricted driver who
operates or is in actual physical control of a vehicle in this state with any
measurable or detectable amount of alcohol in the person's body is guilty of a
class B misdemeanor/' Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-530(l). And under the statute,
"[a] 'measurable or detectable amount' of alcohol" may be established by either
a chemical test, other evidence, or a combination of both. Utah Code Ann. § 416a-530(2).

The facts known to Trooper McCoy established a reasonable,

articulable suspicion that Defendant was in violation of this law.
Two facts known to Trooper McCoy suggested no alcohol use or
impairment: Trooper McCoy did not smell alcohol on Defendant during their
first exchange, R.104:^f 11; and Defendant was able to start his car
notwithstanding the ignition interlock device, R.104:ffl,17. The remaining
factors, however, overwhelm the facts suggesting no alcohol use.
Facts supporting a reasonable suspicion of alcohol use and impairment
included: (1) Defendant drove out of a bar parking lot alone, R.104:l[fl;
(2) Defendant's driving was somewhat erratic —he drove into "the left-hand
turning lane like [he] was going to turn onto the freeway without using a
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signal/' but then "turned back into traffic without using a signal," R.139:8;
(3) Defendant's head was "turned away from the trooper" and he "spoke with a
quiet voice" when he answered the trooper's questions during their first
exchange, R.104:Tf8; (4) Defendant had two prior DUI convictions and was
currently an alcohol restricted driver, R.105:^ 13-14; and (5) once Defendant
faced Trooper McCoy to answer a question, the trooper "smelled the odor of
alcohol coming from [Defendant]," R.105:T|18.4
These facts, when considered together, support a strong inference that
Defendant had in fact consumed alcohol and may be impaired. Although
Trooper McCoy could not smell alcohol initially, he did once Defendant faced
him to indicate he had the ignition interlock device. And that revelation, in
turn, supported a strong inference that in previously turning away from the
trooper when speaking, Defendant was attempting to conceal his alcohol
consumption, see R.139:ll-12—thus manifesting a consciousness of guilt
regarding his driving. See State v. Smith, 927 P.2d 649, 653 (Utah App. 1996)

4

The district court noted that FTO Spillman testified that he had no
articulable suspicion of alcohol consumption before he told Trooper McCoy to
pull Defendant out of the car. See R.106:^22-23. Whether true or not, FTO
Spillman remained in the patrol car when Trooper McCoy reapproached
Defendant the second time and smelled alcohol, which occurred before
Defendant was asked to exit the vehicle. See R.105:^16-18.
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(holding defendant's "attempt[ ] to conceal the drug paraphernalia tendjed] to
show consciousness of his potential guilt regarding manslaughter"); see also
Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119,124 (2000) (holding "nervous, evasive behavior
is a pertinent factor in determining reasonable suspicion'').
The only fact remaining that suggested Defendant had not been drinking
was his ability to start his car, notwithstanding the ignition interlock device. But
ignition interlock devices are not tamper proof, as Defendant himself confirmed
to the officers following his arrest. See R.138:28-29 (admitting ignition interlock
device could be bypassed and he had in fact done so in the past). And, as noted,
Defendant's evasive behavior suggested that he had something to hide. Added
to that, Trooper McCoy determined that Defendant's driving pattern suggested
possible impairment. See R.139:15; accord R.138:16.
In sum, when the facts are viewed as a comprehensive whole, they
support a reasonable suspicion that "criminal activity may be afoot," Terry, 392
U.S. at 21,30, to wit, that Defendant was driving with a measurable amount of
alcohol in the body and may also be impaired. The fact that Defendant's car had
an interlock device was not sufficient to dispel the officers' suspicions where
(1) defendant drove away from the bar alone; (2) Trooper McCoy smelled
alcohol on Defendant; and (3) Defendant manifested a guilty conscience through
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his evasive behavior. Moreover, Defendant's prior DUI record, including the
fact he was still an alcohol restricted driver, added further to the reasonable
suspicion calculus. See State v. Keener, 2008 UT App 288, f 12 n.6,191 P.3d 835
(recognizing a suspect's criminal history "may be part of the circumstances
considered in a probable cause determination"), cert, denied, 205 P.3d 103 (Utah
2009); accord United States v. Dyer, 580 F.3d 386, 392 (6th Cir. 2009) (holding "a
'person of reasonable caution' would take into account predilections revealed by
past crimes or convictions as part of the inquiry into probable cause").5
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should reverse the ruling of the
district court.
The district court's findings and conclusions on the troopers' assessment
of reasonable suspicion overstate their testimony. The court concluded that
"both'[troopers] admitted . . . under cross examination they had no reasonable
articulable suspicion to continue the detention." R.108:f 14; see also R.106:f ^2223. But Trooper McCoy was never asked to address his legal assessment of
reasonable suspicion. See R.139:6-23. And FTO Spillman testified that in
deciding to have Trooper McCoy pull Defendant out of the car, his assessment
of reasonable suspicion was based on Defendant's (1) no alcohol restriction,
(2) requirement to have an ignition interlock device, and (3) prior DUI history.
R.139:32. He also testified on direct examination that Trooper McCoy's
inexperience and the fact Defendant "was really quiet" played a role in directing
Trooper McCoy to pull Defendant out of the car. See R.139:28-29. The district
court's findings and conclusions suggesting more than this are clearly
erroneous. See Krukowski, 2004 UT 94, % 11 (recognizing that factual findings
may be reversed if clearly erroneous).
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U.S. Const, amend IV
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized.
Utah Code Ann. § 53-3-220(1) (a) (West Supp. 2008)
(l)(a) The division shall immediately revoke or, when this chapter or Title
41, Chapter 6a, Traffic Code, specifically provides for denial, suspension, or
disqualification, the division shall deny, suspend, or disqualify the license of a
person upon receiving a record of the person's conviction for:
***

(xv) operating or being in actual physical control of a motor vehicle
while having any measurable or detectable amount of alcohol in the
person's body in violation of Section 41-6a-530;
***

(xvii) operating or being in actual physical control of a motor vehicle in
this state without an ignition interlock system in violation of Section 41-6a518.2.
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-518.2 (West Supp. 2008)
(1) As used in this section:
(a) "ignition interlock system" means a constant monitoring device or
any similar device that:
(i) is in working order at the time of operation or actual physical
control; and
(ii) is certified by the Commissioner of Public Safety in accordance
with Subsection 41-6a-518(8); and
(b) (i) "interlock restricted driver" means a person who:
(A) has been ordered by a court or the Board of Pardons and Parole
as a condition of probation or parole not to operate a motor vehicle
without an ignition interlock system;
(B)(1) within the last three years has been convicted of an offense
that occurred after May 1, 2006 which would be a conviction as defined
under Section 41-6a-501; and
(II) the offense described under Subsection (l)(b)(i)(B)(1) is
committed within ten years from the date that one or more prior
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offenses was committed if the prior offense resulted in a conviction as
defined in Subsection 41-6a-501 (2);
(C) within the last three years has been convicted of a violation of
this section;
(D) within the last three years has had the person's driving privilege
revoked for refusal to submit to a chemical test under Section 41-6a-520,
which refusal occurred after May 1, 2006;
(E) within the last three years has been convicted of a violation of
Section 41-6a-502 and was under the age of 21 at the time the offense
was committed;
(F) within the last six years has been convicted of a felony violation
of Section 41-6a-502 for an offense that occurred after May 1,2006; or
(G) within the last ten years has been convicted of automobile
homicide under Section 76-5-207 for an offense that occurred after May
1,2006; and
(ii) " interlock restricted driver" does not include a person if:
(A) the person's conviction described in Subsection (l)(b)(i)(B)(1) is a
conviction under Section 41-6a-517; and
(B) all of the person's prior convictions described in Subsection
(l)(b)(i)(B)(II) are convictions under Section 41-6a-517.
(2) For purposes of this section, a plea of guilty or no contest to a violation of
Section 41-6a-502 which plea was held in abeyance under Title 11, Chapter 2a,
Pleas in Abeyance, prior to July 1, 2008, is the equivalent of a conviction, even if
the charge has been subsequently reduced or dismissed in accordance with the
plea in abeyance agreement.
(3) An interlock restricted driver that operates or is in actual physical control
of a vehicle in this state without an ignition interlock system is guilty of a class B
misdemeanor.
(4) (a) It is an affirmative defense to a charge of a violation of Subsection (3)
if:
(i) an interlock restricted driver:
(A) operated or was in actual physical control of a vehicle owned by
the interlock restricted driver's employer;
(B) had given written notice to the employer of the interlock
restricted driver's interlock restricted status prior to the operation or
actual physical control under Subsection (4) (a)(i); and
(C) had on the interlock restricted driver's person or in the vehicle at
the time of operation or physical control proof of having given notice to
the interlock restricted driver's employer; and
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(ii) the operation or actual physical control under Subsection
(4)(a)(i)(A) was in the scope of the interlock restricted driver's
employment.
(b) The affirmative defense under Subsection (4)(a) does not apply to:
(i) an employer-owned motor vehicle that is made available to an
interlock restricted driver for personal use; or
(ii) a motor vehicle owned by a business entity that is all or partly
owned or controlled by the interlock restricted driver.
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-530 (West Supp. 2007)
(1) An alcohol restricted driver who operates or is in actual physical control
of a vehicle in this state with any measurable or detectable amount of alcohol in
the person's body is guilty of a class B misdemeanor.
(2) A "measurable or detectable amount" of alcohol in the person's body
may be established by:
(a) a chemical test;
(b) evidence other than a chemical test; or
(c) a combination of Subsections (2) (a) and (b).
(3) For any person convicted of a violation of this section, the court shall
order the installation of an ignition interlock system as a condition of probation
in accordance with Section 41-6a-518 or describe on the record or in a minute
entry why the order would not be appropriate.
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FILED DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

Attorneys for Defendant

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW, ORDER OF SUPPRESSION,
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO
RECONSIDER, AND FINAL ORDER

Plaintiff,
vs.
STEPHEN BRADLEY ADAMSON,
Defendant.

Case No. 091901221
Judge Randall N. Skanchy

Defendant's Motion to Suppress came before the court for an evidentiary hearing
on March 22, 2010.
The State was represented by its counsel, Roger S. Blaylock, and the Defendant
was represented by his counsel, Walter F. Bugden, Jr. and John W. Anderson.
The court received evidence which consisted of the sworn testimony of Utah
Highway Patrol Trooper Cody McCoy and his field training officer Trooper Brian
Spillman.
The matter was taken under advisement.
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The Court now enters the following Findings of Fact:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

At approximately 10:30 p.m., on December 19, 2008, Trooper McCoy and

his field training officer, Trooper Spillman, observed a car leaving a bar parking lot with
a non-operational rear license plate light.
2.

The troopers also observed the vehicle to make an improper lane change.

3.

The troopers conceded that they were waiting in this location in order to

make a DUI stop for training purposes.
4.

A training stop indeed ensued.

5.

Trooper McCoy approached the driver of the vehicle, the Defendant

Stephen Adamson, and asked for his license and registration and asked if he had been
drinking.
6.

Mr. Adamson handed the trooper his registration.

7.

Trooper McCoy thought he had received Mr. Adamson's driver's license.

8.

Mr. Adamson spoke in a quiet voice with his head turned aligkay away

from the trooper.
9.

Mr. Adamson told the trooper that he had not been drinking.

10.

Trooper McCoy returned to his own patrol vehicle to perform a warrants

11.

Trooper McCoy told his field training officer that there was no smell of

check.

alcohol coming from Mr. Adamson.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated
2 OCR, may contain errors.

12.

Upon examination of the material provided by Mr. Adamson, the troopers

realized that Mr. Adamson had given Trooper McCoy a rogiotratioircard, but not his
driver's license.
13.

Nevertheless, the troopers ran a computer check in their patrol vehicle

and determined that Mr. Adamson had a valid Utah driver's license, no outstanding
warrants, but he did have two prior DUI convictions.
14.

The computer check also revealed that Mr. Adamson was an alcohol

restricted driver and was required to maintain an ignition interlock device installed in his
car.
15.

Trooper McCoy returned to Mr. Adamson's vehicle and requested his

driver's license.
16.

Trooper McCoy also asked Mr. Adamson about the existence of an

ignition interlock devise.
17.

Ignition interlock was installed, but Trooper McCoy had not noticed it

during his first interaction with Mr. Adamson when the odor of alcohol was detected.
18.

During this second exchange, Trooper McCoy smelled the odor of alcohol

coming from Mr. Adamson. Trooper McCoy asked Mr. Adamson to exit his vehicle and
field sobriety test were performed.
19.

Mr. Adamson was arrested and charged with a variety of crimes including

Driving under the Influence.
20.

At the preliminary hearing on October 6, 2009, Trooper McCoy and his

training officer, Trooper Spillman both testified.
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21.

Trooper McCoy stated that he expanded the scope of the stop because of

Mr. Adamson's previous DUI's and the requirement that he maintain an ignition interlock
system.
22.

However, Trooper Spillman acknowledged that Trooper McCoy had no

articulable suspicion of alcohol consumption when he returned to Mr. Adamson's car the
second time after conducting the warrants check.
23.

Furthermore, Trooper Spillman agreed under cross examination that he

did not have an articulable suspicion,-much legs a reasonable* ons^that justified a
further investigation after the troopers determined that Mr. Adamson's license was valid
and that there was no odor of alcohol emanating from his person.
BASED UPON the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now enters the
following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The Fourth Amendment guarantees "the right of the people to be secure in

their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable seizures." U.S.
Const. Fourth Amendment.
2.

Stopping a vehicle and detaining its occupants constitutes a seizure under

the Fourth Amendment. State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1131 (Utah 1974).
3.

The Fourth Amendment prohibits only unreasonable searches and

seizures.
4.

The Court therefore must embark upon a two part analysis to determine

whether Trooper McCoy's conduct was reasonable.
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5.

First, the Court must decide whether the officer's actions were justified at

the inception of the stop. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1131-32.
6.

Next, the Court must determine if the resulting detention was reasonably

related to the circumstances that justified the stop in the first place. State v. Chapman,
921 P.2d 446, 450 (Utah 1995).
7.

Once a stop has been made, the detention "must be temporary and last

no longer than necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop." Chapman at 452.
8.

Further detention for questioning constitutes an illegal seizure unless the

officer has a reasonable, articulable, suspicion of further illegal activity. Lopez, 873
P.2d 1131, see also State v. Worwood, 2007 UT47, at paragraph 33; 167 P.3d 397.
9.

The totality of evidence that was available to Trooper McCoy at the initial

stop was insufficient to expand the scope of the search.
10.

The sole facts to support the first stop were the officers witnessing Mr.

Adamson leaving a bar parking lot at night with an inoperable rear license plate light,
and an improper lane change.
11.

During the initial contact with Mr. Adamson, Trooper McCoy observed only

a soft voice and the lack of direct facial contact with the trooper.
12.

The court concludes that Officer McCoy impermissibly extended the scope

of the detention beyond its original intent.
13.

In weighing the evidence, Trooper McCoy did not have a reasonable,

articulable suspicion of alcohol use to justify expanding the scope.
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14.

Trooper McCoy and Spillman both admitted precisely this point under

cross examination they had no reasonable articulable suspicion to continue the
detention.
15.

Mr. Adamson's prior criminal record carries only minimal weight, and by

itself, is inadequate to justify infringing one's right to privacy.
16.

Trooper Spillman admitted at the preliminary hearing that: "We were trying

to find someone who was driving impaired so [McCoy] could have the experience of
field sobriety tests and arresting an impaired driver." Yet Mr. Adamson was pulled over
for unrelated infractions.
17.

Therefore, leaving the sole reason for expanding the scope to Mr.

Adamson's stop beyond issuing the citations for the minor traffic infractions was Mr.
Adamson's criminal record.
18.

"Criminal history alone is insufficient to give rise to the necessary

reasonable suspicion to shift the focus of the traffic stop to an investigation of criminal
activity." State v. Dennis, 2007 UT App. 266 at paragraph 12, (citation omitted).
19.

Mr. Adamson was pulled over for a non-operational rear license plate and

an improper lane change.
20.

After initial stop, Trooper McCoy and Trooper Spillman both

acknowledged that they had no articulable suspicion to continue the detention.
21.

This is all the troopers had to extend the detention and it is constitutionally

inadequate to extend the detention.
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BASED UPON the foregoing Conclusions of Law, the Court now enters the
Orders as follows:

ORDER OF SUPPRESSION
1. The Court grants the Defendant's motion to suppress.
2. The State's Motion to Reconsider is denied.
3. The resulting evidence from the unlawful seizure of the Defendant which
proceeded from extending the scope of the detention impermissibly must be
suppressed under the exclusionary rule. State v. Worwood, 2007 UT47, 167
P.3d 397. (the exclusionary rule keeps out of trial evidence obtained through a
violation of an individuals constitutional rights.)
4. This is the final Order in this matter.
DATED this & 2 d a y o f ^ S ^ 2 0 1 0 .

BY THE COURT:

Judge R

Skahchy

;>

.TC **)
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ADDENDUMC
Memorandum Decision and Order
[on Defendant's Motion to Suppress]
(dated 04/16/2010)
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
vs •

:

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER

:

CASE NO. 091901221

:

STEPHEN B. ADAMSON,

:

Defendant.

Judge Randall N. Skanchy

:

Before the Court is defendant Stephen Adamson's Motion to Suppress.
The matter has been fully briefed by the parties, evidence was presented,
and oral argument was held March 22, 2010, after which the Court took the
matter under advisement.

Accordingly, the matter is now ready for the

Court's decision.
BACKGROUND
At approximately
Patrol

Trooper

Officer,

Cody

10:30 p.m., on December 19, 2008, Utah Highway
McCoy

Trooper Brian

("Trooper McCoy")

Spillman

and his Field

("Trooper Spillman"),

Training

observed

a car

leaving a bar parking lot with a non-operational rear license plate light
and

thereafter

saw the vehicle

make

an improper

lane

change.

The

Troopers were admittedly waiting in this location in order to make a DUI
stop for training purposes.

A traffic stop ensued.

the driver, defendant Stephen Adamson

Trooper McCoy asked

("Mr. Adamson"), for his license

and registration and asked him if he had been drinking.
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handed the trooper his registration, what Trooper McCoy thought to be a
driver's license, and, in a quiet voice, with his head turned away from
the Trooper, Mr. Adamson responded

that he had not been drinking.

Trooper McCoy returned to his own vehicle for a warrant check and told
Trooper Spillman that there had not been the smell of alcohol coming from
Mr. Adamson.
the

Troopers

Upon examination of the material Mr. Adamson had provided,
realized

that

Mr. Adamson

had

given

Trooper

McCoy a

registration card., rather than his driver's license. Nevertheless, the
troopers were able to run a computer check on Mr. Adamson which indicated
that he had a valid driver's license, no outstanding warrants, and two
prior DUI convictions.

The computer check also noted that Mr. Adamson

was an alcohol restricted driver, and was required to have an ignition
interlock device installed in his car. Trooper 'McCoy returned to Mr.
Adamson's vehicle, asked for his driver's license, and asked Mr. Adamson
about the existence of the interlock device.

During this exchange

Trooper McCoy smelled the odor of alcohol emanating from Mr. Adamson.
Trooper McCoy then asked Mr. Adamson to exit his vehicle, and field
sobriety tests were performed, whereafter Mr. Adamson was charged with
driving under the influence of alcohol and/or drugs, among other crimes.
Mr. Adamson moves the Court to suppress the results of the field
sobriety tests, the chemical tests and Mr. Adamson's statements, arguing
that the question regarding the interlock device and the sobriety tests
were unlawful because they extended beyond the scope of the initial
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

STATE V. ADAMSON

PAGE 3

MEMORANDUM DECISION

purpose of the traffic stop. The State argues that the investigation for
traffic infractions properly grew into an investigation of driving under
the influence.
DISCUSSION
The Fourth Amendment guarantees the "right of the people to be
secure

in

their

persons,

houses,

unreasonable searches and seizures."

papers,

and

effects,

against

U.S. Const, amend. IV. Stopping a

vehicle and detaining its occupants constitutes a seizure under the
Fourth Amendment.
Although

police

State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1131
must

have

a warrant

to conduct

most

(Utah 1994).
searches

and

seizures, "officers may temporarily detain a vehicle and its occupants
upon

reasonable

suspicion

of

criminal

activity

for

conducting a limited investigation of the suspicion."

the purpose

of

State v. Baker,

2010 UT 18, % 11, 651 Utah Adv. Rep. 25 (citation omitted).
Because the Fourth Amendment prohibits only unreasonable

searches

and seizures, the Court must conduct a two-part analysis to determine
whether Trooper McCoy's conduct was reasonable.

First, the Court must

decide whether the officer's actions were justified at the inception of
the stop.

Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1131-32.

Mr. Adamson does not argue that

the stop itself was unlawful, as the officers were justified in stopping
the defendant for the improper lane change and burned out light.
Next, the Court must determine whether the resulting detention was
reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the stop
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State v. Chapman, 921 P.2d 446, 450 (Utah 1995).

Generally, once a stop has been made, the detention "must be temporary
and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the
stop.". Id. at 452.
illegal

Further detention for questioning constitutes an

seizure unless the officer has a reasonable, articulable

suspicion of further illegality. Lopez,, 873 P. 2d at 1132; see also State
v. Worwood,

2007 UT 47, ^

33, 164 P.3d

397

(citation omitted).

Reasonable suspicion means suspicion based on specific, articulable facts
drawn from the totality of the circumstances facing the officer at the
time of the stop."

Lopez., 873 P. 2d at 1132. Without further evidence

of criminal activity, law enforcement must either arrest, cite or release
the driver. State v. Chapman, 921 P.2d 446, 453 (Utah 1995) . The Court
must view the facts behind the officer's suspicion in light of common
sense, granting deference to an officer's ability to detect suspicious
actions.

Id. However, the officer may not rely on merely an "inchoate

and unparticularized suspicion" or hunch.

Id.

The parties disagree as to whether the subsequent detention was
based on a reasonable articulable suspicion of other criminal behavior.
The State argues that while conducting the traffic stop for Mr. Adams on's
burned out light and improper lane change, Trooper McCoy formed a new
reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity as justification
for further questioning.

In particular, the computer check on Mr.

Adamson informed the officers of Mr. Adamson's prior DUIs and that he was
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required to have an interlock system installed in his car.

The State

argues that it was permissible for Trooper McCoy to inquire about the
interlock device, and when he smelled alcohol on the defendant's breath,
he was entitled to extend the detention.
The question before the Court is whether subsequent questioning
about the ignition interlock device was an acceptable extension of the
detention.

Subsequently, his questioning would be acceptable if the

Trooper had a new reasonable, articulable suspicion that Mr. Adamson had
been drinking and driving.
requires

a fact-specific

articulable

facts

The reasonableness of an officer's conduct
analysis where

against

one's

unreasonable search and seizure.

Fourth

courts generally weigh
Amendment

rights

the

against

Case law assists in the determination

of where this dividing line should be.
In State v. Chapman, the defendant was loitering in a parked car in
a school parking lot after hours with a woman.

The officer was made

aware after the initial detention that the defendant was an alleged gang
member and had been armed in the past.
the defendant was unarmed.

A Terry frisk was performed and

The suspect admitted to the officer that he

had a gun in the vehicle, which was recovered and a weapons
indicated the gun was stolen.

check

The Utah Supreme Court acknowledged that

a Terry frisk was acceptable for the officer's safety but once the man
"was outside the vehicle and known to be unarmed, however, the officers
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had no reasonable, articulable suspicion either to continue questioning
him regarding weapons or to search for them."

Jd. at 453

In State v. Lafond, 2003 UT App 101, 68 P.3d 1043, officers stopped
the defendant's car for speeding and a burned out light.

The stop

expanded into a possible DUI. The Utah Court of Appeals.held that the
officers had reasonable suspicion to expand the scope of the stop.

In

the State's favor was evidence that the driver had a suspended license
for DUI, and the officer noted a large, refillable cup in the console and
a bag with a whiskey insignia.

The officer also noted the passenger's

strange movement to retrieve a small bag. Taken in their totality, the
articulable • facts, as well as the officer's experience, justified
reasonable suspicion of more serious criminal activity.
Finally, in State v. Dennis, 2007 UT App 266, 167 P.3d 528,

the

court upheld a traffic stop that had expanded from a cracked windshield
violation into an arrest for drugs and stolen items. The court held that
the officers met the reasonable suspicion burden as a result of the
following facts: it was the middle of the night, the car was near a motel
known for drug dealings, the .officers knew of the occupants' prior
criminal histories and alleged drug use, and stereo equipment and drug
paraphernalia were visible in the back seat. Although the Court of
Appeals upheld the arrest as legitimate, it noted that any one of the
officers' rationales, for expanding the stop, by itself, would not rise
to the level of reasonable suspicion.

In particular, the Court noted
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that prior " [c] riminal history alone is 'insufficient to give rise to the
necessary reasonable suspicion' to shift the focus of a traffic stop to
an investigation of criminal activity."

Id. at f 12 (citing United

States'v. Sandoval, 29 F.3d 537, 543 (10th Cir. 1994) ("If the law were
otherwise, any person with any sort of criminal record . . . could be
subjected to a Terry-type investigative stop by a law enforcement officer
at any time without the need for any other justification at all.") ) . The
totality of the evidence in Dennis was the basis for the officer's
reasonable articulable suspicion of further criminal activity.

Id.

In this case, Mr. Adamson argues that Trooper McCoy did not have
reasonable suspicion to expand the scope of the stop from an improper
lane change and burned out light to one for DUI.

He points out that

McCoy did not smell the odor of alcohol on him during their first
encounter, and it was only after McCoy asked Mr. Adamson about the
interlock device did the trooper notice the smell.

Mr. Adamson argues

that the officer had no right to ask about the interlock system, as
intoxicated driving was not the purpose of the initial stop.
During the preliminary hearing on October 6, 2009, Trooper McCoy and
his training officer, Trooper Spillman, both testified.

Trooper McCoy

stated that he expanded the scope of the stop because of Mr. Adamson7s
previous DUIs and the required

interlock system required.

Trooper

Spillman testified that he suggested Trooper McCoy investigate potential
alcohol use-because:
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Obviously the driver had a lengthy history with DUI arrests.
I was concerned. A lot of time some alcoholic beverages are
tough to detect. Even for seasoned officers there's some
alcoholic beverages that are hard to smell. [Trooper McCoy]
did state that, that he was really quiet and so I was
concerned that he might have not caught on to the fact that he
was actually consuming alcohol at that time.
Trooper
articulable

Spillman
suspicion

further

acknowledged

that

Trooper

McCoy

had

no

of alcohol consumption when he first returned, to

the patrol car.
The totality of evidence that was available to Trooper McCoy at the
initial stop was insufficient to expand the scope of the search.

The

sole facts to support the first stop were the officers witnessing Mr.
Adamson's leaving a bar parking lot at night, with an inoperable rear
license plate light and an improper lane change, a soft voice at the stop
and lack of direct facial contact with the Trooper.
The Court determines that Officer McCoy impermissibly extended the
scope of the detention beyond its original intent.

In weighing the

evidence, McCoy did not have a reasonable, articulable .suspicion of
alcohol use to justify expanding the scope. Mr. Adamson's prior criminal
record carries only minimal weight, and by itself is inadequate to
justify infringing one's right to privacy. Trooper Spillman admitted at
the preliminary hearing: "we were trying to find someone that was driving
impaired so that [McCoy] could have the experience of, of field sobriety
tests and arresting an impaired driver."

Yet Mr. Adamson was pulled

over because of unrelated infractions, leaving the sole reason for
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expanding the stop Mr. Adamson's criminal record.
Appeals held,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
As the Utah Court of

u

[c]riminal history alone is xinsufficient to give rise

to the necessary reasonable suspicion7 to shift the focus of a traffic
stop to an investigation of criminal activity."

State v. Dennis, 2007

UT App 266 at ^ 12 (citation omitted) .
CONCLUSION1
For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants the defendant's Motion
to Suppress. "[E]ven a small intrusion beyond the legitimate scope of an
initially lawful search is unlawful under the Fourth Amendment." State
v. Baker, 2010 UT 18 at % 28 (Utah 2010) (citing Schlosser, 774 P.2d at
1135).

The resulting

evidence

from

suppressed under the exclusionary rule.

the unlawful

seizure

must

be

See State v. Worwood, 2007 UT

47, P42 (Utah 2007) (the exclusionary rule keeps out of trial evidence
obtained through a violation of an individual's constitutional rights).

RANDALL N. SKANClhf- L:.'r^,-.. .'V :! ' ;•
DISTRICT COURT[ JUDGE :\;; •;. '.; ^ ]}: ,

1

The State does not argue the inevitable discovery doctrine; asiucHTthe Court
did not consider its merits. See State v. Worwood, 2007 UT 47,143, 164 P.3d 397 (the
inevitable discovery doctrine requires "persuasive evidence that events apart from those
resulting in illegal police activity that would have inevitably led to discovery for causal
link between initial illegality and evidence to be broken.").
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
vs.

:

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER

:

CASE NO. 091901221

:

STEPHEN B. ADAMSON,

:

. Defendant.

Judge Randall N. Skanchy

:

The Court has before it the State of Utah's ("State") Motion for
reconsideration of the Court's earlier decision on defendant Stephen B.
Adamson's ("Mr. Adamson") Motion to Suppress.

The matter has been fully

briefed by the parties and argued to the Court on June 7, 2010.

The

Court, having considered the Motion to Reconsider, hereby denies the
same. The State cannot prolong a detention without reasonable articulable
suspicion. -State v. Chapman, 921 P.2d 446, 453 (Utah 1995).
In ths case, Mr. Adamson was pulled over for a non-operational rear
license plate light and an improper lane change. After the initial stop,
Trooper

McCoy

and

Trooper

Spillman

both

acknowledge

articulable suspicion to continue the detention.

they

had

no

"Criminal history alone

is insufficient to give rise to the necessary reasonable suspicion to
shift the focus of a traffic stop to an investigation of criminal
activity."

State v. Dennis, 2007 UT App 266 ^ 12, 167 P.3d 528 (internal
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quotation marks omitted).

This is all the troopers had and it isn't

enough under the case law. of this state.
Accordingly, the Motion to Reconsider is hereby denied, and counsel
for Mr. Adamson is directed to prepare Findings and an Order consistent
with the Court's ruling.
Dated this

O

v?*^^.

day of June, 2010

(t

....

.. .. ^

\
RANDALL N. SKANCHY
DISTRICT COURT \jyDGE
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